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STRESS IN THE WORKPLACE: JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS AND 
LEGISLATIVE AND BUSINESS RESPONSES 
Introduction 
by 
Anthony Libertella * 
and 
George Barbero** 
In 1989 stress related workers' compensation cases accounted for 15% of all 
occupational disease claims. (I) Although most stress claims are currently litigated 
within the workers' compensation system, with average payments of $15,000, the 
dollar amount and volume of claims is projected to increase dramatically. (2) Stress 
currently ranks as one of the top ten work-related problems. (3> The Northwestern 
National Life Insurance Company study of 1991 indicates that the incidence of stress 
claims has doubled in the past ten years, <4> and the number of employees experiencing 
stress also has doubled during the same time period. <5> Currently seven out of ten 
employees surveyed claim to experience work-related stress symptoms. <6> 
The factors most commonly cited by employees as causing stress-related 
illnesses are: reduction of employee benefits, lack of personal control over one's job, 
mergers and acquisitions or change in business ownership resulting in 
major departmental reorganizations causing job changes and frequent overtime. (T) It 
appears that the corporate culture fosters unhealthy and too stressful enviro?ments, with 
unrealistic demands frequently burdening the employees. Of the populatiOn surveyed 
the Northwestern study found that 34% of employees expect to burnout on the job and 
72% of all workers experience three or more stress related illnesses on a frequent 
basis. <B> If the number of stress-related illnesses continues to expand as projected by 
this study, stress claims are anticipated to lead all other workers' compensation claims 
in the 1990's. 
* Associate Professor of Studies on Corporate Values, Hagan School of Business, 
Iona College, New Rochelle, New York 
** Professor of Business Law, Hagan School of Business, Iona College, New 
Rochelle, New York 
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The purpose of this article is to explore the judicial developments and 
the legislative and business responses as they relate to the increasing number of 
employees seeking compensation for job-related stress illnesses. This article first 
examines workers' compensation claims where mental or psychic stress causes a mental 
or psychological disability. Selected cases, including the most recent holdings, are 
reviewed to demonstrate the criteria laid down by various state courts in denying or 
permitting recovery for such claims. Next, consideration is given to situations where 
employees have gone outside of the workers' compensation field to pursue their job-
stress claims either under human rights legislation or common law tort. The article 
then describes the responses of various state legislative bodies and the business 
community to the flood of work-related stress claims. Lastly, the newly emerging 
trends in job-related stress illnesses and claims will be discussed, with a brief 
commentary on necessity of a careful balancing of the interest by employers, 
employees and soctety at large in resolving this emerging crisis in the workplace. 
Workers' Compensation Stress Claims 
Under the great majority of workers' compensation statutes it is not any 
workplace injury that entitles an employee to compensation benefits, but only those that 
are determined to be accidental. <9> Most statutes define "injury" and "personal injury" 
to mean "only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment." 0°> 
Prior to recent statutory amendments in some states, the statutes typically did not 
specify any particular injury nor was any reference made to stress claims. From a 
historical point of view, whether a so-called stress or mental injury claim was 
compensable, depended upon case law within each state. 
Workers' compensation claims involving mental stress are often classified as 
follows: mental-physical claims in which mental stress causes physical disability 
(anxiety induced coronary attack), physical-mental claims in which physical injury 
causes a mental disability (conversion hysteria following traumatic injury), and mental-
mental claims in which mental stress causes mental disability (nervous breakdown 
caused by emotional stress). 0 1> 
Traditionally, the workers' compensation boards and courts are most likely to 
grant awards in the physical-mental and mental-physical cases; all fifty states regard 
such claims as compensable.0 2> However, in the new and somewhat uncharted territory 
of mental-mental cases, which is the focus of this paper, there are several difficult 
issues for determination by the courts. Since there is no physical corroboration for the 
disability, it is extremely difficult to prove that a mental disability was caused by work. 
The uncertainties inherent in psychiatry make it difficult to determine whether there 
was a pre-existing mental illness. Additionally, it is difficult to determine if work-
related stress is an aggravating factor to a pre-existing condition, and if so, whether this 
should be compensable under workers' compensation.<tJ> In the resolution of these 
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issues the state courts differ in the criteria to be applied as an examination of selected 
cases below will demonstrate. 
The manner in which state courts have viewed the complex issue of mental-
mental claims can be broken into four categories: (1} those denying recovery for 
mental-mental claims; (2) those allowing recovery where the mental stress involves 
sudden shock; (3) those allowing recovery when the mental stress is unusual; (4) those 
allowing recovery where the mental stress is not unusual. <14> 
State Courts Denying Recovery for Mental-Mental Claims 
The states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Dakota are among the minority, and do not 
permit compensation for mental-mental stress cases under any circumstances.05l 
The following two cases exemplify this minority view. The Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma in 1990 addressed the issue of the compensability of a mental-mental claim 
in Fenwich v. Oklaboma State Penitentiary.<16l In this case, a state penitentiary 
employee's claim for mental disability resulting from an incident in which he was held 
hostage for a few hours was denied. The court concluded that mental injury caused by 
work-related stress without physical trauma is not compensable under the Oklahoma 
Workers' Compensation Act. <17l 
In a fairly recent South Dakota Supreme Court case, Lather v, Huron 
the issue of mental-mental compensability was considered for the first time. 
Here, the employee left his position as a college basketball coach because of work-
related stress. Subsequently, he was treated for a psychological disorder which 
ultimately led to his suicide. The court, in denying the claim, held that mental 
disability caused by a mental stimulus was not compensable. <19> 
State Courts that Permit Recovery in Mental Injury Caused by Sudden 
The second category is composed of states that permit compensation if the 
source of the mental stress is caused by a sudden or shocking event. These states are: 
Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.<2°l 
An example where the courts applied this somewhat stringent criterion is found 
in Transportation Insurance Company v. Maksyn.<2tl where the Supreme Court of 
Texas held that gradual mental stress is not compensable, and that recovery for mental 
injury was limited to those claimants who had suffered sudden injury. In this particular 
case the claimant, an employee of a publishing company, was subjected to an excessive 
work load that required constant and excessive overtime, and therefore, because of the 
ongoing nature of the injury it was not deemed compensable. <22> 
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Other courts, however, have not only allowed recovery for mental-mental 
claims caused by sudden or shocking stimuli, but also allowed recovery for mental 
injuries stemming from gradual and extraordinary stress as well, as shown in the recent 
Mississippi Supreme Court case of Borden v. Eskridge. (23) where the court upheld the 
disability claim based upon severe depression. Here, the claimant alleged maltreatment 
by his supervisor causing him to live in a state of anxiety and depression. The court 
held that a worker seeking benefits for psychological injury must show extraordinary 
causes, not those usually associated with the workplace. {24) 
State Courts that Permit Recovery in Cases of Unusual Mental Stress ,. 
The third category of states includes Arizona, Arkansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming, all of which allow compensation for 
mental-mental claims if the source of the mental stress is considered to be unusual and 
in excess of the amount of stress normally associated with everyday employment. (25) 
New York is one state that has adopted the majority view, after its highest court 
resisted ruling on mental-mental claims for years. In 1975, in the landmark case of 
Wolfe v. Sibley. Lindsay & Curr Co.,<26l the New York Court of Appeals for the first 
time considered the question of whether psychic trauma is a readily identifiable cause 
of psychological or nervous injury. Having earlier decided in Klimas v. Trans 
Caribbean Airways (27) that an injury caused by emotional stress or shock may be 
accidental within the purview of the compensation law, and having uniformly sustained 
awards previously where physical impact resulted in nervous or psychological 
disorders,<28> the court in Wolfe, by a four to two decision, and despite a vigorous 
dissent, reversed the Appellate Division's denial of the award, and held that the 
psychological or nervous injury precipitated by psychic trauma is compensable to the 
same extent as physical injury. <29> The claimant, employed as a secretary, worked for a 
department store security director who was suffering from a nervous condition. The 
supervisor relied heavily on the claimant who not only assumed some of her 
supervisor's duties, but became his confidante on the subject of his increasing anxiety 
and nervous condition. After calling the police in response to her supervisor's request 
and failing to reach him on the intercom, she entered his office and found him lying in 
a pool of blood caused by a self-inflicted gunshot wound in the head. She became 
extremely upset, lost time from work, and received psychiatric care with 
hospitalization. Her condition was diagnosed as acute depressive disorder. (30) 
The court, in reinstating the compensation award, noted that, having recognized 
the reliability of identifying psychic trauma as a cause of physical injury in some cases 
(mental-physical), and psychological injury as a resultant factor in other cases 
(physical-mental), it saw no reason for limiting recovery in the latter instance to cases 
involving physical impact.(31) Citing Battalia v. State of New York(32) which eliminated 
the "impact" doctrine in the field of torts, the court stated: "There is nothing 
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talismanic about physical impact. "(33) In passing, the court also noted that its analysis 
reflected the majority of decisions in this country. (34) 
Apparently, in an effort to restrict the application of its holding and to 
distinguish the instant case from its holding in Tobin v. Grossman.(35l which refused to 
extend to third parties a cause of action in torts for psychic injury incurred without 
impact, the court pointed out that the claimant here was not a third party merely 
witnessing an injury to another, but was an active panicipant in being involved in her 
supervisor's nervous condition. (36l In addition, not only did she consider his suicide a 
personal failure, but she was an integral part of the tragedy by virtue of his last 
communication and her discovery of his lifeless body. <37l 
Following Wolfe, the appellate courts in New York have affirmed a number of 
awards to claimants where psychological injury was attributable to psychic trauma. In 
Gamble v. New York State Narcotics Addict Control Commission.<38l an award for 
death benefits was affirmed where the claimant suffered psychic trauma resulting from 
a job change. The court held that the claimant's resulting psychosis and mental 
derangement caused his suicide and thereby constituted an accidental injury. (39) 
In another very recent New York case, Friedman v. NBC. Inc.<40> the court held 
that a widow of an NBC-TV employee was entitled to compensation due to her 
husband's work-related suicide. The court unanimously ruled that although the 
deceased suffered from undiagnosed depression for twenty years prior to his suicide, 
that his suicide was a result of the depressed condition that was related to stress in his 
employment. A reorganization of NBC in 1978 led to deceased's being forced to carry 
a beeper, and work extensive overtime during the nights and weekends. In 1980, he 
was given a new title and additional responsibilities as manager of the company's 
video tape library, an area that had long suffered from operational problems. In his 
final letters to his wife and supervisor, he stated that he could no longer face what he 
saw as his inevitable failure in this newly assigned capacity. The court held that 
workers' compensation death benefits may be awarded if work-related stress causes 
insanity or a pattern of mental deterioration. <41> It further noted that the "casual 
relationship" between an industrial accident and a resulting mental condition need not 
be direct and immediate rather, "it is sufficient that the work related stress be a 
contributing cause of the psychic injury. "<42> 
In some cases the New York appellate courts have denied awards to claimants in 
mental injury claims. In Everett v. A.S. Steel Rule Die Comoration.<43l the court held 
the claimant did not sustain an industrial accident within the meaning of the Workers' 
Compensation Act where he became incapacitated due to a mental condition causally 
related to his observation of a bloody bandage on the hand of a coworker. Relying on 
the holding in Wolfe, where the claimant was an active participant, the court stated that 
it does not extend compensability to mental-mental injury sustained by a claimant who 
merely observes an injured coworker.<44l 
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An example of how the appellate courts in New York have differed in the 
application of Wolfe is seen in Wood v. Laidlaw Transit. Inc .. <45) where the claimant, a 
school bus driver, came upon the scene of a gruesome automobile accident in which 
two young children, known to her, died. She thereafter developed symptoms of a 
psychological nature requiring hospitalization and treatment for a condition diagnosed 
as a post-traumatic stress disorder. Relying on the "active participant" criterion in 
Wolfe, the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation 
Board awarding benefits. On further appeal, the Court of Appeals, also relying on 
Wolfe, reversed the Appellate Division and affirmed the decision of the Board on the 
grounds that the claimant "an active participant in the tragedy. "<46> 
Subsequent to Wolfe, other states in responding to the increase in workplace 
stress have placed themselves in the mainstream of workers' compensation 
jurisprudence by accepting mental-mental claims. Stokes v. First National Bank,<47) a 
South Carolina case is just such an example. Here, a bank employee suffered a 
nervous breakdown as a result of a greatly increased work load and job responsibility, a 
by-product of a corporate merger.<48l The South Carolina Court of Appeals, in 
accepting mental-mental claims for the first time, held that the claimants prolonged 
increase in work hours, combined with additional job duties constituted "unusual and 
extraordinary conditions of employment" which resulted in a compensable accidental 
injury. <49> 
In Candelaria v. General Electric Co., <50) a New Mexico case, the claimant 
suffered anxiety attacks with several hospitalizations resulting from personality conflicts 
with his supervisor. The court held that psychological injury resulting from a sudden 
or gradual emotional stimulus "arises out of' employment when it is causally related to 
job performance. (51) 
Until Sparks v. Tulane Medical Center Hospital & Clinic.<52) the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana had never considered the issue of the compensability of a mental-mental 
claim. Here, the employee claimed that she had been continually harassed and 
threatened by co-employees causing her to suffer a disabling mental condition. <53) The 
court noted that mental health is an intrinsic component of the physical structure of the 
body and that the circumstances here satisfied the requirement of an accidental 
injury. <54> 
State Courts that Permit Recovery if the Source of the Mental Stress is Not 
Unusual 
The final category of states, which have accepted mental-mental compensation 
claims, includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, 1\entucky, Michigan, New Jersey, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, all of which have allowed such claims even 
if the cause of the mental stress is not deemed to be unusual or excessive. (55) 
Carter v. General Motors,<56l was one of the earliest cases to recognize the 
compensability of claims where mental injury results in the absence of physical impact 
\ 
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or physical stimulus. Here, the claimant developed a paranoid schizophrenia condition 
and required hospitalization after being unable to keep up with the pace of work 
demanded by his supervisor, although such work was shown not to be unusual. The 
Supreme Court of Michigan held that "emotional disabilities are compensable under the 
Workers' Compensation Act regardless of whether the cause was a direct physical 
injury or mental shock. "<57l 
Following Carter, the Michigan courts affirmed awards in mental-mental cases, 
including those based upon workers' subjective perceptions of stress. <58> However, 
following a 1980 amendment to the Michigan Compensation Law, <59> in 1991 the Court 
of Appeals in Iloyan v. General Motors Corp.<60> clearly rejected the subjective 
standard test applied in earlier cases. Here, the plaintiff alleged having "major 
depression" with the onset emotional disorder occurring in relationship to the stress he 
allegedly experienced in his workplace, where he described himself as "feeling 
mistreated, pressured and demeaned."<61> In reversing an award by the Workers' 
Compensation Board, the court held that the Board mistakenly applied the invalidated 
Deziel subjective standard and that the correct legal standard to be applied was that of 
an actual, precipitating, work-related trauma, event, or events and not just an 
unfounded perception thereof. (62) 
Human Rights Cases and Job-Related Stress 
While the greater number of job-related stress claims are made under workers' 
compensation, in some instances, employees have been able to successfully pursue such 
claims outside of the workers' compensation area. In New York City Transit Authority 
v. State Division of Human Rights (Adrienne Nash)<63> the New York State Court of 
Appeals reversed an appellate court ordered reduction of a $450,0000 award for mental 
anguish in a sex discrimination case, and remitted the matter to the Appellate Division 
for reconsideration. The high court noted that, "Mental suffering is not only 
compensable, but also a frequent sometimes sole, consequence of unlawful 
discriminatory condition. "(64) 
Another recent case from New York's highest court, exemplifying its 
willingness to compensate employees for mental anguish and humiliation in 
discrimination cases, is Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Inc. v. New 
York State Division of Human Rights (Pamela Easton).<65> The court held that there 
was substantial evidence supporting the finding of the State Commissioner of Human 
Rights, that Consolidated Edison discriminated against Pamela Easton, a black woman, 
on the basis of sex and race, by promoting two white males to supervisory positions, 
both of whom lacked her experience level. In upholding the Commissioner's award of 
$10,000 for hurt, humiliation, and mental anguish suffered, the court noted "the effects 
of discrimination were perceived everyday when the complainant reported to white 
males, petitioners had promoted over her. "<66> 
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Tort Cases and Job-Related Stress 
Workers' compensation acts typically provide the sole or exclusive means for 
workers to receive compensation benefits, with recovery unaffected by any 
negligence on the part of the employer. Yet because workers' compensation limits the 
recovery, attorneys frequently search for alternatives to employer's exclusivity of 
remedy protection. In recent years we have seen instances in which appellate courts 
have carved exceptions to exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation 
law, particularly with respect to non-physical employee tortious acts, such as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment, and discrimination. 
In some work-related mental stress claims pursued under state discrimination 
statutes, employers have raised the issue of the "exclusive remedy" provisions of the 
state workers' compensation laws. This issue was squarely faced in Boscaglia v. 
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., <67l where the claimant brought an action for damages 
alleging violation of her civil rights and sought recovery for physical and mental or 
emotional injury. Here, the court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Workers' Compensation Act did not bar such an action where the employee was 
alleging a violation of the Fair Employment Practice Act or the Michigan Civil Rights 
Act.<68> 
'• .o; ... -.;. ... 
In Rojo v. Kliger,<69> where an employee brought an action against her employer 
and co-employees for sexual harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Acts 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the California Supreme Court held that 
an employee need not seek remedy through the Fair Employment and Housing Acts 
before filing suit on common law grounds of sexual discrimination. This decision lends 
support to the argument that civil and workers' compensation remedies should be 
cumulative rather than mutually exclusive. The California Labor Code allows tort 
damages to be awarded against coworkers guilty of sexual harassment, without a 
reduction of workers' compensation benefit awards. (70) 
In Levinson v. Prentice Hall. Inc.<71), the United States District Court permitted 
a handicapped employee to first prove that the employer violated state fair employment 
practice and then to receive back pay, compensation damages and reinstatement. The 
court then permitted the employee to apply common law principles to seek punitive 
damages. This case demonstrated how common law employment rights can be used to 
obtain large punitive awards on top of those awards already granted by state and federal 
civil rights law. Levinson claimed he had been denied several promotions and had 
been repeatedly subjected to ridicule and mimicked for his uneven walk. Levinson 
claimed that the ridicule emotionally hurt, resulting in his crying in bed to his wife, 
apologizing for not getting the promotion and for being less of a man for not receiving 
a promotion. Levinson, who suf\ered from multiple sclerosis, sued for punitive and 
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compensatory damages for emotional distress. The court awarded him $100,000 for 
mental suffering due to discrimination and 2.3 million dollars in punitive damages<72l. 
In Pikop v. Burlington Northern Railroad Company, <73> a railroad employee 
filed suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging that she was constantly 
insulted by her supervisor, forced to observe as her coworkers tortured and killed rats 
and birds, and the company refused to listen to her complaints. <74> The Supreme Court 
of Minnesota held that claims of employees against the railroad for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress did not necessitate the showing of physical injury under state tort 
law and, thereby, were not preempted by either the Railway Labor Act or the Federal 
Employers Liability Act, which limit recovery to intentional torts that cause physical 
injury. <75> 
legislative Responses to Stress-Related Claims 
State legislative bodies have responded to the flood of stress-related claims and 
to the liberal and expansive judicial interpretation of compensation statutes, which has 
broadened the application of the concepts of "accident" and "injury" to include mental-
mental claims. Some legislative amendments to workers' compensation statutes 
narrowly redefine "accident" and "injury" to expressly prohibit mental stress claims. 
Other amendments establish new criteria in the determination of mental injury claims, 
and some create more demanding standards of proof. 
It appears that Montana has taken an extreme position in excluding all mental 
stress claims when it amended its definition of "injury" under its compensation act by 
excluding physical and mental conditions arising from emotional or mental stress or 
non-physical stimulus or activity. <76> Thus, workers who suffer heart attacks from job-
related stress are no longer covered (mental-physical claims), nor are workers who 
suffer a disabling nervous breakdown or any psychological disorder resulting from 
emotional or mental stress (mental-mental claims).<77l 
On the other hand, Massachusetts and New York have taken a more modest 
position in excluding job-related mental stress claims that arise out of bona fide 
personnel actions. The Massachusetts legislature amended its compensation laws, and 
in effect overruled the decision in Kelly's Case,<78> by adding the following: "No 
mental or emotional disability arising principally out of a bona fide, personnel action 
including a transfer, promotion, demotion, or termination except such action which is 
the intentional infliction of emotional harm shall be deemed to be a personal injury 
within the meaning of this chapter. "(79) Strikingly similar language is found in the New 
York amendment which states that the "terms 'injury' and 'personal injury' shall not 
include an injury that is solely mental and is based on work-related stress, if such 
mental injury is a direct consequence of a lawful personnel decision, involving a 
disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, demotion, or termination taken in 
good faith by the employer. "<SO) It appears that this amendment in effect reverses the 
holding in Gamble. <81l 
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The recent legislative enactments regarding mental-mental claims in other states 
vary in the degree of complexity. The amendments in Louisiana, Oregon, Michigan, 
Colorado, California and New Mexico are good examples. 
Apparently, in a direct response to Sparks,<82> Louisiana's Workers' 
Compensation Act was amended to provide a new definition of "injury" as follows: 
"Mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be considered a 
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and is not 
compensable . . . unless the tal injury was the result of a sudden, unexpected, and 
extraordinary stress related to employment and is demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence. "(83) Furthermore, a new subsection for mental injury or illness requires a 
diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and the diagnosis must meet the 
criteria of the American Psychiatric Association.<84> This would appear to rule out an 
employee's subjective allegation as to the appearance of symptoms of mental injury 
such as anxiety, and that the mental injury must be precipitated by an "accident". In 
addition, the requirement of "clear and convincing evidence" creates a new element of 
proof, more demanding than previously required. <85> Oregon, similar to Louisiana in 
complexity, and in establishing new criteria for mental injury claims, amended its 
statute providing for a strict set of standards for the compensability of such claims. 
First, the claimant must now establish that the work conditions creating the mental 
disorder exist in an objective sense; second, the employment conditions establishing the 
mental disorder are not conditions inherent in everyday work situations, such as 
disciplinary actions, job performance evaluations, and termination of employment; 
third, the diagnosis of the emotional disorder must be acceptable in the medical 
community; finally, the claimant must present clear and convincing evidence that the 
mental disorder arose out of and in the course of employment. <86> 
Michigan's legislature limited mental injury claims by amending its 
compensation statute to read that "mental disabilities and conditions of the aging 
process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions shall be 
compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a 
significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual 
events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof w<81l (italics supplied) In 
requiring that the mental disability be related to employment in a significant manner 
creates a stricter standard than that found in Moreover, this amendment 
clearly invalidates the subjective "honest perception" test found in Dezie1,<89> 
Colorado's amendment now defines "accident", "injury", and "occupational 
disease" as not including "disability or death caused _by or resulting from mental or 
emotional stress unless it is shown by competent evidence that such mental or 
emotional stress is proximately caused solely by hazards to which the worker would not 
have been equally exposed outside the employment. "<90> 
California by amendment has estabVshed a new and higher threshold of 
compensability for psychiatric injury by a diagnosis of mental injury or 
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disorder meeting the criteria of the American Psychiatry Association or criteria 
generally approved and accepted nationally by practitioners in the field of psychiatric 
medicine.<91) Additionally, the employee must demonstrate by a preponderance of 
evidence that actual events of employment were responsible for at least 10% of the total 
causation from all sources contributing to the psychiatric injury. <92> 
Governor Pete Wilson proposed an amendment that would require workers to 
prove that their mental disability came from their employment, not their families or 
personal lives. (93) Although, the legislature did not agree to this reform, they did enact 
a requirement that workers must be employed six months prior to their claim. <94> 
Finally, the New Mexico legislature, in response to Candelaria<95> amended its 
compensation act by redefining primary mental impairment "to mean a mental illness 
arising from an accidental injury involving not physical injury and consists of a 
psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside of a worker's usual experience 
. . . but is not an event in connection with disciplinary, corrective or job evaluation 
action or cessation of the worker's employment. "<96> 
Business Responses to Stress-Related Claims 
A variety of actions have been undertaken by employers to prevent the sources 
of stress that are precipitating mental stress claims, such as making use of diagnostic 
stress systems, providing individual counseling, and creating stress-reduction and 
control programs. (97) Employees from companies that offer stress reduction programs 
are 50% less likely to miss work or quit their jobs due to stress, according to the 
Northwestern Life Insurance survey. <98> Researchers calculated the average cost of 
rehabilitating stress disabled employees at $1925 and, if not rehabilitated, the cost 
would be an average of $73,270.<99> The survey also showed that the employers who 
offered stress-reduction programs have more healthful employees, with higher rates of 
productivity, lower turnover and less absenteeism.<100> Due to the increase of mental-
mental claims, and the frequently ensuing likelihood of litigation, it has become 
essential for employers to learn to protect themselves. 
The optimal strategy appears to be one of teaching employees to effectively 
handle the pressure of their jobs, and thus reduce the occurrence of work-related stress 
tnJunes. For example, Texas Instruments Inc. has initiated a holistic stress 
management philosophy that encompasses a wide range of programs. <101> The National 
Employee Services and Records Association, a non-profit organization with over 15 
million members nation-wide, cited Texas Instruments Inc. as the Employer of the 
Year in 1991, based largely on their employee services and recognition programs along 
with their organizational structure that places a high value on people. 002> Texas 
Instruments sees stress as a useful and positive force in the workplace and attempts to 
educate employees through their wellness program, Lifetrack.<103> This program is 
available at three major United States facilities, and includes health assessments and 
recommendations for participation in company-sponsored wellness programs. <104> The 
19 
Lifetrack materials cover a wide range of topics and provide explanations of the 
mechanism of stress in the workplace; the materials are family-oriented and promote a 
balanced life style for Within the past three years, employees participating 
in Lifetrack health assessments have shown a 7% improvement in how they cope with 
stress. <105> 
In companies throughout the United States increasing numbers of professionals 
and managers are rejecting grueling work loads, much of which leads to stress despite 
the frequent high salaries that accompany these positions. Employees are reconsidering 
their priorities and are seemingly willing to accept salary reductions in exchange for 
time they need for their personal lives. John P. Robinson, Director of Americans Use 
of Time Project for the University of Maryland, claims that leisure time not money, 
will be the status symbol of the 1990's.006> In a study Robinson conducted for the 
Hilton Hotel Corporation, 50% of all workers surveyed were willing to forego one 
day's pay per week for the additional day of rest time. 0°1l Over three quarters of the 
respondents place "more time to spend with friends and family" as their top priority, 
whereas only 61% chose "making more money" as their primary goal.0°8> Similar 
concerns for a balanced lifestyle in reducing stress have been addressed by Texas 
Instruments, Inc. which has established part-time work-pilot programs. 009> 
Developing Trends in Job-Related Stress 
The number of stress in the 1990's is expected to increase as a result of a 
changing work environment, namely, work-place technology becoming more 
sophisticated (the use of VDT terminals, computers, and electronic monitoring), the 
increased presence of workers with AIDS and HIV positive, the employment of 
disabled persons, and the perceptions of workers being sexually harassed and 
discriminated. 
In ILC Data Device v. County of Suffolk0 10> a New York appellate court 
recently heard arguments in an attempt to resurrect a 1988 law regarding the use of 
video display terminals in companies with over 20 terminal users. The law was voided 
in late 1989 by the New York State Supreme Court, which ruled the county was barred 
by the State Home Rule law from enaCting laws affecting employee/employer 
relations.0 1n The 1988 law required employers with more than 20 video display 
terminal users to provide equipment meeting standards for stress reduction, specified 
lighting and noise reduction devices, as well as 15-minute breaks for every three hours 
of employee work time. 012) A similar law was struck down in California as being 
overridden by the State's Occupational Safety and Health law; the issues being raised 
challenge whether these statutes directed at workplace stress conflict with the federal 
OSHA Act of 1970.<113) 
At the 1991 annual meeting of the Factors Society commentators 
indicated that the effect of technostress that required increased research. 
Thomas Sheridan, a professor of Man-Machines Laboratory at MIT, asserted that 
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computers and automation have alienated workers, and the use of computer networks 
has led to a blurring of the lines of work responsibility and accountability. 014> 
Lawrence Schleiter, a research psychologist with the Stress Reduction Laboratory at the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, is concerned by the findings of 
his investigation regarding electronic performance monitoring. <115> Although Schleiter 
believes technology can contribute to positive changes in the workplace, he fears that it 
also brings with it an interference into the dynamics of interaction in the workplace. <116> 
Researchers have found that employees who are electronically monitored by 
their supervisors report higher levels of stress and repetitive strain illnesses. Dr. 
Michael Smith, head of Industrial Energy Department of the University of Wisconsin, 
in his study of seven regional telephone companies, Ol7) found that monitored workers 
reported greater work load dissatisfaction, and a perception of less control over their 
jobs and greater levels of anxiety and tension. Smith's study concluded that electronic 
monitoring had a negative effect on employee perceptions of their work. 0 18> 
Another area of growing concern for potential increase of stress claims is the 
increase of AIDS in the workplace.<119> William Donnelly, Public Education 
Coordinator for the AIDS Foundation, citing statistics on the impact of AIDS in the 
workplace, projected that at least one million HIV positive employees are currently in 
the workplace and forecasts a dramatic increase in stress-related claims from 
employees working closely with HIV positive coworkers.<12°> The stresses related to 
those working in high risk professions ·(public health, medical , public safety) have 
shown the need to minimize the risk and stress through educational programs. Work-
related stress can also become a contributing factor in accelerating the HIV virus for an 
HIV positive employee. It is believed that stress hastens the disease's progress and 
companies might eventually have to deal with claims based on this factor.0 21 >. For 
example, in a recent New York decision, Castro v. New Life Insurance Company,022> 
the court upheld a claim for negligent infliction of distress in an AIDS phobia case. 
Here, the claimant, a cleaning woman, developed AIDS phobia after being struck by a 
negligently disposed hypodermic needle. 
The employment of disabled persons poses another area of concern for 
employers. California workers' compensation attorney, Richard H. Jordan, 
recommended that congress should amend the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
or the EEO Commission should issue new regulations to avoid the difficulties 
employers are now facing from employees claiming emotional stress caused by 
personnel actions. 0 23> In many states, employees currently have the right to seek 
workers' compensation benefits and ADA remedies when they are suffering from 
emotional disorders and are denied employment opportunities by the employer they 
worked for at the time of their injury.<124> Jordan recommends eliminating job stress 
claims based on personnel actions from workers' compensation, establishing a new 
grievance system, and prohibiting employees from using decisions from workers' 
compensation tribunals to support claims of mental impairments under the ADA; he 
believes these changes would free employers from a fear of unlimited and unrestricted 
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liability for mental injuries and would further the intention of the workers' 
compensation law and the ADA. (125) 
Another developing trend relating to job stress is found in the area of sex 
and harassment, where victims report difficulty in sleeping, 
hstlessness, depressiOn, deep feelings of worthlessness and self-blame. (126) Some 
the sexual harassment claims are costing American companies a 
staggenng $11 bilhon annually .<127) Under a 1986 Supreme Court decision sexual 
was to be a form of discrimination, for which the employer is 
held hable.028> Studies show 90% of the women in the work force see sexual 
harassment as a major problem. 029> Companies with stringent sexual harassment 
productivity and morale. (130> According to a survey conducted 
by magazme 74% of all companies have sexual harassment policies.031J The 
key to a successful sexual harassment prohibition policy appears to be a combination of 
commitment by management, education and intervention. Companies who choose not 
to deal effectively with this problem, may one day find themselves paying vast sums in 
discrimination suits. 
Conclusion 
Stress induced psychological disorders are becoming the fastest developing 
segment of occupational ills, with the number of mental-mental claims continuing to 
grow each year. This growth can be attributed to a number of economic 
psychological, and sociological reasons, including technological advances in societ; 
and overall work environment situations. In addition, the courts liberal interpretation 
of workers' compensation laws, human rights law and common law torts, to embrace 
work-related stress claims, have contributed to the growth of such claims. There can 
be little doubt that mental claims caused by workplace stress will continue to increase 
with more. litigation in the workers' compensation and state court systems, with the 
resultant high cost to employers, employees and society at large. 
While employers have in some measure met with success in lobbying state 
legislatures for changes in workers' compensation laws in order to reduce mental-
mental claims, it is questionable whether this will be an effective solution to the 
crisis in society engendered by stress related disability claims. While the 
legislatures, and to a lesser degree, the courts, are faced with the difficult and delicate 
task of balancing the interest of employers, workers, and society at large, the pervasive 
nature of work-place stress and its resultant disability cannot be ignored. As one court 
noted, anxiety, strain and mental stress from work are frequently more 
devastatmg than a mere physical injury . .. ". (132) 
Perhaps a better solution would be for employers to adopt a holistic strt-
philosophy would focus more on the value of workers as perso s 
and mto account human needs. <133> Employers might develop progra s 
promotmg a balanced hfe style and allowing time for their employees' personal and 
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family lives. Other stress reduction and stress control programs could be instituted by 
employers. These might include educating employees to effectively handle stress, 
providing individual and group counseling, and adopting new policies designed to 
foster better work environments and better relationships between employers and 
employees. These initiatives will go a long way toward the resolution of this emerging 
crisis . 
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COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF ANTITRUST LAW 
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
By 
Roy J. Girasa* 
Pace University 
Antitrust law in the Unites States and in Japan are 
fundamentally similar. There are, however, significant 
and minor differences. Both aspects will be explored in 
this paper. We will first summarily examine the nature 
of antitrust law in the United States and then compare 
its common and dissimilar characteristics with that of 
Japan. 
There are three basic statutes which together Wi·th 
their amendments define antitrust prohibitions and 
sanctions in the United States. They are: the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914 and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act to 1914. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 18901 
The act as amended states: 
Section 1 "Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is hereby declared to be 
illegal. Every person who shall make 
any such contract or engage in any 
such combination or conspiracy shall 
be guilty of a felony ... 
Section 2 "Every person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony ... " 
Jurisdiction The constitutional basis for 
Congressional intervention in antitrust activities is 
*J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law, Lubin School of 
Business, Pace University, Pleasantville,New York. 
27 
